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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IS IN A SUPERIOR POSITION TO
ASSESS WITNESS CREDIBIIITY .

The function of the administrative law judge in the workers7 compensation
setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil arena. Therefore, the
administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should
generally be binding on the reviewing court, which in this case is the Appeals
Board. The administrative law judge, not the Appeals Board is in the best position
to make a credibility determination, and as such, a credibility determination of a
witness should only be overturned if it is clearly erroneous. In this case, there was
substantial evidence to support the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge, and
therefore, they should have been upheld. By finding that the Administrative Law
Judge is not in a position to make credibility determinations, we are in effect taking
away any role that the Administrative Law Judge may play in the adjudicative
process. If the Administrative Law Judge does not have any role to fulfill, why not
eliminate the position altogether and send the cases right to the Appeals Board and
let them make the determination. Why have an Administrative Law Judge if the
Appeals Board is going to ignore the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and
enter its own finding and conclusions.
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A.

The Appeals Board must consider the Findings of the
Administrative Law ludge.

The Respondent's reliance on United States Steel v. Industrial Com'n, 607
P.2d 807 (Utah 1980), is misplaced. While it is true that it was held that the
Commission may make its own findings on the credibility of the evidence
presented, the Supreme Court also held that in so doing, the Commission must
consider the findings of the Administrative Law Judge as part of the record. kL at
810; See also Adams v. Industrial Common of Arizona. 710 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Ariz.
App. 1985)("Normally, a proper credibility evaluation requires that the fact finder
hear and observe the witness. Credibility is not readily discernible by one who
merely reads a cold record.").
In United States Steel the Administrative Law Judge found there was not an
industrial accident, which finding was then overturned by the Commission. The
Commission found that the applicant's failure to report an accident sheds light on
whether an accident occurred, but is not enough for denying relief, j d . at 812.
Although there was similar conflicting testimony with regards to Ms. Chambers'
reporting of the accident, and that of the applicant in United States Steel, the
similarities between the two cases ends there. The focus in United States Steel was
on the applicant's failure to report the injury. The Appeals Board in this case
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incorrectly reversed the credibility determination made by the administrative law
judge focusing only on the evidence surrounding the reporting of the accident.
(See, R. 261-263; Order of Remand, page 2). However, as pointed out in the Brief
of Appellant, the fact that the applicant failed to immediately report the accident is
only one fact that was considered by the administrative law judge in its credibility
determination, and the Appeals Board reversal of the administrative law judge's
credibility determination on this fact alone was clearly erroneous. There were also
other issues that were analyzed by the administrative law judge in making its
credibility determination of the applicant. The Administrative Law Judge was able
to observe and witness the applicant as she gave her testimony. The applicant also
began working full-time for another employer the day after the alleged accident. It
was also reported by the applicant that she was unable to pursue treatments for her
alleged back injury because Red Cliff denied compensation benefits. (R. 330, page
38 lines 13-15). However, upon cross examination, the applicant testified that
treatments were not stopped due to a lack of money as she had earlier testified. (R.
330, page 74 lines 10-21). Next, the applicant reported that she reported her injury
to Val Penman, an employee at Red Cliffs (R. 330, page 28 lines 14-23)., however,
he did not remember every talking to the applicant about a work injury. (R. 330,
page 103 lines 15-20). He testified that if she would have notified him, he would
have filled out an incident report since which was the standard procedure.
-3-

Furthermore, Respondent fails to point out that the Court in United States
Steel, held that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge must be considered as
part of the record. Respondent also fails to address a more recent case decided by
the Supreme Court where it was held that the trier of fact or the hearer of evidence
is in the best position to ascertain credibility of witnesses, and as such, deference
should be given to the initial decision maker on questions of fact because it stands
in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the
credibility and accuracy of witnesses. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 1 77
(Utah 1997). Similarly, it has been held that the Administrative Law Judge's findings
are to be affirmed as long as the evidence supports those findings. See Birrell v.
Ind. Comm'n. 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987).
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge, not the Appeals Board
heard the evidence and witnessed the testimony of the various witnesses. As such,
the Administrative Law Judge was clearly in a superior position to evaluate and
weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. The Appeal Board
was required to considered the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge and should
have given deference to the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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B.

The function of the Administrative Law ludge is similar to that of
the fact-finder in the civil arena.

The function of the administrative law judge in the workers' compensation
setting is akin to the function of the fact-finder in the civil arena. Adams v.
Industrial Comm'n of Arizona. 710 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Ariz. App. 1985).
Respondent attempts to distinguish this case on the basis that the system used in
Arizona is not comparable to Utah's system because the ALJ's decision constitutes
final agency action as opposed to Utah's system which allows additional agency
action. In addition, Respondent points out that in Adams the question involved a
replacement ALj substituting its own findings for the original ALj. (See Appellee's
Brief at page 16). Contrary to Respondents position the underlying issues addressed
in Adams, and those in this case are the same. In both the Arizona case and this
case, the findings of the original ALJ are being substituted or replaced by a
reviewing individual or board. As such, the holding and reasoning in Adams, can
be applied here. Appellate courts have therefore consistently espoused the rule that
the administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally
binding on the reviewing court. The purpose of this rule is that the fact finder is in
the best position to consider the voice tone, hesitation or readiness with answers,
his eyes, pitch or uncertainty of the witness's voice, gestures, expressions, and other
non verbal communication. ] d . Much like Adams or in a civil arena, the fact-finder,
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who in this case would be the Administrative Law Judge, is in the best position to
consider credibility of a witness as they testify and deference should be given.
In this particular case, the administrative law judge, not the appeals board
was in a position to observe the countenance and candor of the Applicant as she
attempted to testify. What the administrative law judge observed as the Applicant
testified, could not be reviewed or observed by the Appeals Board by reviewing a
written record. By only reviewing the written testimony, the Appeals Board is only
reviewing part of the testimony of the Applicant. The applicant's voice tone, facial
expression, body language, skin tones, fidgety movements, the confidence in her
answers, lack of eye contact, all affect the credibility determination made by the
administrative law judge which the Appeals Board was unable to review by looking
at the written record. These are all items that cannot be reviewed by the Appeals
Board, and historically are items that have not been the subject of an appeal. The
administrative law judge who takes the actual evidence and reviews the testimony is
in the best position to feel what is being presented and to get a sense of the
applicant's credibility. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997).
Therefore, the Appeals Board failure to consider the Findings of the Administrative
Law Judge was improper, and the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge should
be upheld as they were supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Board
failed to show or find that the ALJ's findings were clearly wrong.
-6-

It is clear from the evidence that the Appeals Board reversal of the
administrative law judge's credibility determination based solely on the fact that the
applicant may or may not have immediately reported the accident is contrary to the
weight of the evidence. As stated above, there were numerous other factors which
the administrative law judge based his credibility determination on besides the fact
that the applicant did not immediately report her injury. The administrative law
judge, not the Appeals Board is in the best position to make a credibility
determination, and such determination should only be overturned if it is clearly
erroneous. In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the
Administrative Law Judge, and therefore, they should have been upheld.

II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY AWARDED
TEMPORARY DISABILITY AS THE APPLICANT HAD REACHED
STABILIZATION.
It has been held that "every person who brings a claim in a court or at a

hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal/' Bunnell v. Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333
(Utah 1987). The administrative law judge initially found that because of the
applicant's lack of credibility, there was no industrial accident. Therefore, there was
no need for Red Cliff to present any evidence regarding the applicant's claim for
temporary disability payments. However, due to the Appeals Board reversal of the
-7-

decision of the administrative law judge, the administrative law judge found that the
applicant was entitled to temporary partial disability payments through August 25,
1997. (R. 274-278). The administrative law judge's award of temporary disability
payments exceed the time in which the applicant had reached medical stabilization,
and therefore it should be at a minimum modified to reflect only the time until the
applicant had reached stabilization.
A.

Stabilization occurs at that point in time that there is nothing more that
can be done.

When a claimant reaches medical stabilization, she is no longer eligible for
temporary benefits. Griffith v. Industrial Comm'n, 754 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). The administrative law judge's award of temporary partial disability
payments through August 25, 1997, exceeded the time in which the applicant had
reached medical stabilization. (R. 274-278). Temporary disability benefits are to be
discontinued as soon as the point of medical stabilization is reached. Reddish v.
Sentinel Consumer Prods.. 771 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The medical
records clearly indicate that the applicant had reached stabilization long before
August 25, 1997, therefore, the administrative law judge erred in extending
disability payments past the point at which the applicant had reached stabilization.
The medical records are clear that the applicant had reached stabilization long
before August 25, 1997, as the applicant did not seek any treatment for her back
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after April of 1997. (R. 330, page 81). Another key indicator that the applicant had
reached stabilization long before August of 1997, was the fact that it was reported
there was nothing more that could be done, therefore therapy for her back was
discontinued. (R. 330, page 74). Furthermore, there is no indication in the medical
records that the applicant had not healed from the alleged accident. The fact that it
was reported there was nothing more that could be done for the applicant along
with no indication whatsoever in the records that the applicant had not healed from
the alleged accident indicates that stabilization had occurred.
B.

Temporary disability payments are not proper as the applicant began
working full-time for another employer immediately after the accident.

Temporary disability ceases when the claimant returns to work initially
following accident. Sanderson v. Industrial Comm'n, 400 P.2d 756 (Utah 1965).
Temporary disability payments "are intended to compensate a [worker] during the
period of healing and until she is able to return to work. . ." Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617, 619-20 (Utah 1977); Second Injury Fund v.
Streator Chevrolet. 709 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1985). The applicant was clearly able to
return to work as she went to full-time status the very next day at her other job
Therefore, an award of temporary disability was improper and should be
overturned.
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Prior to the alleged accident, the applicant had only been working part-time
at both places of employment, and immediately after the accident she began
working full-time for her other employer, Washington ARC. (R. 330, page 46 lines
15-18; R. 57). As previously stated, the record is clear that the Ms. Chambers was
able to perform light duty work as she continue working for Washington ARC, and
went to work the very next day. Another important factor is the fact that Ms.
Chambers went from a part-time employee working approximately 18-20 hours per
week to basically a full time employee immediately after the accident.
Providing Red Cliff the opportunity for a hearing would have allowed them to
point out the evidence that was already before the judge in the form of the medical
records exhibit, which clearly refuted the applicant's claim for temporary disability
payments, which at a minimum, would have established that she had reached
medical stabilization in March I997. Any temporary disability payments should
have ceased in March of 1997, as the medical records clearly established that the
applicant had reached stabilization. Temporary disability payments are to be
discontinued upon returning to work. The applicant never missed work because of
the accident, therefore, Red Cliffs should not be required to pay any type of
temporary disability payments to the applicant.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Red Cliff respectfully requests that the findings of
fact of the Appeals Board be set aside and order that the administrative law judge
findings as to the credibility determination be upheld. In the alternative, Red Cliffs
request that the decision by the administrative law judge denying them of a hearing
with regards to temporary disability be overturned. Finally, Red Cliffs requests that
the award for temporary disability payments be overturned as it should not be
required to pay any temporary disability because the applicant was able to perform
light duty work, and refused to perform light duty work at Red Cliffs, but rather
began working full-time for another employer.

DATED this the J j _

day of July, 1999.

PLANT^WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

THEODORE E. KANELL
ROBERT COLSEN
Attorney for Defendant
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